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I . INTRODUCTION
etermining the proper standard of liability for personal injuries
and property damages is one of the central missions of the law
of tort. The law addresses that issue at two separate levels. First,
within the domain of accidental injuries caused by the defendant,
there is the perennial question of whether the applicable standard of
liability should be cast in terms of negligence or strict liability. Is a
defendant responsible only where he has failed to act with reasonable care under the circumstances, or is he responsible for harms
even where there has been no failure to observe the appropriate
standard of care? The second question is in a sense subordinate to
the first but nonetheless closely entwined with it: Where a negligence standard is applicable, how should negligence be determined?
Two distinct approaches are possible on this last question. On
the one hand, it is often said that the test of negligence is whether
the defendant took all cost-justified precautions against the occurrence of the harm. The economic calculations involved require a jury
to make at least some impressionistic assessments of the likelihood
that the defendant’s conduct will result in harm, the expected severity of that harm, and the cost of avoiding the occurrence. The alternative method relies on custom-not so much the custom of the
individual or the firm, but that of the trade or industry of which the
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defendant is a part. Here the relevant question is this: Where the
defendant has complied with an industry custom, is that an absolute
defense against a charge of negligence, and therefore a finding of liability, or is it only evidence, perhaps very substantial evidence, to rebut the plaintiffs charge of negligence?
At a high enough level of abstraction there is no functional distinction between these two standards. If courts and juries could effortlessly apply the cost-benefit formulas, then the only conduct that
would be held tortious is that which should not have been undertaken in the first place.1 By the same token if customs always incorporated all the relevant information about the costs and benefits of
certain practices, then they too would treat as negligent only conduct that should not have been undertaken in the first place. On the
issue of negligence, both these standards should in an ideal world
converge to a single correct answer. Nonetheless within the modern
framework, these two standards are in strong tension, precisely because in a world filled with imperfections the dominant question is
which approach generates the fewest errors at the lowest cost. The
standard answer today seems to be to use some variation of the costbenefit standard, leaving custom with a subordinate role in the
overall analysis.2
It is surely more than coincidence that the most forceful exposition of both sides of this relationship is found in the work of a single
judge, Learned Hand. His famous decision in United States v. CarroZZ Towing3 championed a standard that relied on the simple cost1 See, for example, John Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of
Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 323 (1973), for the initial formal demonstration of
the roposition.
P “By the great weight of modern American authority a custom either to
take or omit a precaution is generally admissible as bearing on what is proper
conduct in the circumstances, but is not conclusive.” Fowler V. Harper,
Fleming James, Jr., & Oscar S. Gray, The Law of Torts, 579 (2d ed. 1986).
3 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). “[T]h e owner’s duty, as in other similar
situations, to provide against resulting injuries is a function of three variables:
(1) the probability that she will break away, (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate precautions. Possibly it serves to
bring this not into relief to state it in algebraic terms: if the probability be
called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is
less than L multiplied by P: i.e. whether B < PL.” The statement was developed in connection wi& the facts in the particular case, but is easily general-
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benefit calculus. Some years earlier, in an admiralty case, The TJ
Hooper,J he addressed the relationship between custom and negligence. Its facts were as follows. The tugboat ZJ. Haoper, along with
several other tugs, was making its way up the Atlantic coast when it
was caught in a storm that resulted in the loss of its barge and cargo.
If its captain had carried an adequate receiving set, then (or so the
question was resolved)5 he would have received warning of the storm
from the naval station at Arlington, Virginia, soon enough to put in
safely behind the Atlantic breakwater thus avoiding the loss of barge
and cargo.6 But having been caught in the storm, the tug owner was
sued by both the owners of the barge and the cargo for their loss.
The critical question was whether the tug should have carried a
receiving set on board in order to meet the requirements of good
care. Learned Hand-in a most questionable proposition--first held
that there was no custom that tugs should carry receiving sets while
in transit, and then stated the objections to a standard of negligence
based on custom in language more eloquent and forceful than anyone else, either before or since, has put it:
ized to all situations, and has spawned an enormous literature. See, for example, Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1. J. Legal Stud. 29 (1972);
Steven Shave& Economic Analysis of Accident Law (1987). Shavell, heavily
concerned with cost-benefit analyses, does not cite The T.J Huuper or discuss
the relationship between custom and negligence. His formal orientation leaves
little place for such institutional issues as the role of custom.
4 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
5 There are two implicit causal complications in the case. First, the warnings from the radio would have made no difference if the captain could have acquired the same information through other means. Second, the warnings
would be irrelevant if they had arrived too late to make a difference. The implicit causal finding is that they would have made a difference, a point contested
by the tug in its brief. See Brief on Behalf of Northern Barge Corporation,
The TJ. Hoofer, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932) (No. 430).
6The actual case was complicated by two points of little theoretical relevance. First, the owner of the cargo sued the owner of the barge claiming the
unseaworthiness of its vessel. Second, there was some argument as to the causal
role of the radio in *avoiding loss. Both of these questions consumed enormous
space in the briefs. Thus, for the Northern Barge Corporation, the brief devoted two pages to demonstrating that “[tlugs’ failure to have efficient radio receiving apparatus made them unseaworthy’ (id. at 4-6) and fourteen pages to
the proposition that “[t]he Barges were seaworthy’ (id. at 6-20).
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There are, no doubt, cases where courts seem to make the
general practice of the calling the standard of proper diligence; we have indeed given some currency to the notion
ourselves. . . . Indeed in most cases reasonable prudence is
in fact common prudence; but strictly it is never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices. It may never set its own
tests, however persuasive be its uses. Courts must in the end
say what is required; there are precautions so imperative
that even their universal disregard will not excuse their
omission.7
The proposition as stated by Learned Hand did not break any
new legal ground, but carried over into the law of admiralty the judicial caution about the use of custom in negligence cases that
dominated the common law then as now. Hand’s opinion fell securely within the legal mainstream of his own time and was greeted
with relatively little commentary. The T.J Hooper is not included,
for example, in the 1939 edition of Leon Green’s tort case book* It is
a bit player in the first edition of Prosser’s handbook on torts.g Nor
was the case explicitly mentioned by Clarence Morris in his classic
1942 article, “Custom and Negligence,” which sets out the received
wisdom on the subject and which has wielded enormous influence
on the field.10 But the opinion has been cited and quoted far more
frequently, and with uniform approval in, say, the past generation.
Until recently, the major articles on custom in tort cases have all
explored its continued tenacity, itself endorsed by Morris,11 in the
area of medical malpractice.12 As far as I am aware, the most
sustained recent treatment of the case, with due recognition of its
’ 60 F. 2d, sups note 4, at 740.
* Leon Green, The Judicial Process in Tort Cases (2d ed. 1939):
g William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (1941).
lo Clarence Morris 9 Custom and .Negligence, 42 Colum. L. Rev. 1147
(1942).
l1 Id at 1164-65.
I2 See, for example, Joseph H. King, In Search of a Standard of Care for
the Medical Profession: The ‘Accepted Practice’ Formula, 28 Vand. L. Rev.
1213 (1975); Allan H. McCoid, The C are Required of Medical Practitioners,
12 Vand. L. Rev. 549 (1959).
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failings, is provided by Landes and Posner.13 Although in the interim the issue has arisen in thousands of tort cases, it has not been
subject to any systematic reexamination.
In this article, I shall examine the role of custom in the law of
negligence, with special reference to The T.J. Hooper. The subject is
one of enormous importance. I hope to show that, given the imperfections of the legal system, the conventional wisdom that places
cost-benefit analysis first and custom second is incorrect in at least
two ways. First, in cases that arise out of a consensual arrangement,
negligence is often the appropriate standard for liability, and, where
it is so, custom should be regarded as conclusive evidence of due care
in the-absence of any contractual stipulation to the contrary. It is
quite possible that in some consensual settings no custom will
emerge, at which point the negligence inquiry will be inescapably ad
hoc. But where consistent custom emerges, regardless of its origins,
it should be followed. Second, in stranger cases-that is, those
where the harm does not fall on a contracting party or someone
with whom the defendant has a special relationship-negligence
should normally not be the appropriate standard of care,14 so that
reliance on custom is as irrelevant as the negligence issue to which
custom alone is properly directed. But where negligence is adopted
in these stranger cases, 15 then custom is normally not the appropriate
standard because it registers the preferences of the parties to the
custom, not those who are victimized by it. It should be taken into
account, but given no dispositive weight.
Since much, if not most, of the litigation over custom comes in
consensual situations, the choice between custom and cost-benefit
l3 Wiiam M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of
Tort Law 131-39 (1987).
l4 See, for example, Restatement of the Law, Torts 2d, @519-520
(ultrahazardous activities). Section 519 makes it appear as though strict liability
is a powerful rule because it imposes liability on a defendant “although he has
exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm .n But much of its rigor is compromised in 5820, which seti out tests to determine which activities are ultrahazardous, and embeds a negligence test into this part of the analysis. A return
to strict liability is far more evident in §52OA, which imposes strict liability
for harms caused by flying aircraft or things that drop or fall from them.
l5 See, for example, id. at 5166 (trespass to land); $826 (nuisance cases).
There is of course contrary authority, but the weight of the precedents is not
the issue addressed in this article. -
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formulas lies at the heart of understanding the distribution of power
between the market and the courts in setting the standards of conduct for defendants in all lines of business and endeavors. Although
championed by Landes and Posner, Shavell and other conservative
economists, the cost-benefit formula is, when generally applied, far
more interventionist than the standard of care based on custom.
These cost-benefit tests are used to challenge the rationality of markets, while formulas based on custom accept and rely on some level
of implicit rationality in market behavior.
This article is organized as follows: In Section II, I examine the
weight custom should receive in setting liability as a matter of first
principle. In Section III, I examine a related question, namely, under what circumstances should we expect to see a custom emerge at
all? Section IV then looks historically at the role of custom in the
law of tort before the decision in The T.J Hooper and concludes
that, while courts sometimes stated that unreasonable customs
should not be respected, cases in which unreasonable customs are
actually identified seem most difficult to find. In Section V, I take a
closer look at the decision in The TJ Hooper itself, and how it continues the basic argument. The customs governing that case were
misstated and misunderstood by Learned Hand. Properly stated and
understood, these customs were sufficient to impose liability on the
defendant wholly without regard to Hand’s soaring rhetoric. The
decision in the case was correct, even though the reasoning was
wrong. In closing, I offer a brief assessment of The T.J HooperS influence in the subsequent law of torts, not so much in the admiralty
context where it arose, but for the common law in general.
II. WHY RESPECT CUSTOM?
Customs are ubiquitous. The sheet metal worker who wants to
make a proper weld, the salesman who wants to conclude a deal, the
ship captain who wants to negotiate a dangerous channel, the athlete who wants to do well for a big race, the accountant who wants
to balance the books, the proofreader who wants to check the accuracy of text, all rely constantly on relatively simple rules of thumb
and standard practices to guide them in their daily work In other
settings custom may be more sophisticated. Just as customs could
arise about a standard medical procedure, so too a “meta” custom
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could (and doubtless does) regulate the way in which one form of
medical practice yields to a newer and more enlightened alternative.
Viewed apart from the world of litigation, most situations are not
distinctive or novel but fall into certain repetitive patterns. Common
practices, sanctioned by general usage, that cover these similar situations are what I (in accordance with long usage) mean by customs.
Customs are one critical way people organize their daily and professional lives to free their creative energy for the distinctive tasks that
may lie before them. It is scarcely possible to imagine how any of us
could organize the daily task of living and coping without extensive--and perhaps unconscious-reliance on myriad customs.
I treat customs as relatively discrete and bounded in most cases,
although there is obviously some period of flux as certain practices
rise in popularity and then decline. Notwithstanding the occasional
borderline problem-problems that have not proved severe for the
vast case law that deals with custom-the black-and-white quality
of customs is probably an accurate reflection of most areas of business and social life. The key point is the level of routine repetition.
that custom presupposes. Individual actors need a high level of certainty in their ordinary affairs, and that certainty cannot come from
probabilistic judgments or delicate evaluations about borderline cases.
It is easier to delineate sharp categories (for example, between the
wholesale and the retail trade) and to force persons to assume either
one clear role or the other than it is to allow a thousand shades of
gray to block the emergence of uniform rules. Within any particular
trade, as an empirical generalization, the demarcations that are sharp
and clear to insiders may seem obscure to an outsider.16
l6 Two examples follow. In the law book business, there is a very sharp
line between books sold to the law schools and books sold to the bar, and companies that work both markets divide their labor such that they cannot sell
books (for example, monographs) that do not fall into either category. In the
furniture business, there isa Sharp distinction between persons who sell to the
trade and personswho sell at reta& and admission to certain shows and buying
privileges depends heavily on which side of the line one is. The older common
law often follows these categorical lines, as with the tripartite distinction of
trespassers, licensees, and i&tees, defended on categorical grounds even by
judges who understood the occurrence of marginal cases. See, for example,
Robert Addie & Sons (Collieries), Ltd. v. Dumbreck, [1929] A.C. 358 (per
Viscount Dunedin).
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If custom is indispensable to ordinary life, it has nonetheless
been greeted with an uneasy ambivalence in the narrower and more
focused setting at common law. 17 Clearly there are some limitations
on the use of custom that should be respected. As regards consensual
arrangements between two or more parties, the applicable standards
of liability are, and should be, those that are set by voluntary
contract, even if that agreement should run contrary to established
industry custom. Contract itself is a technique that allows private
parties to individuate their own arrangements. Let it be the case that
10,000 people have decided to require that goods be delivered under
a contract before the money need be paid, but it counts for naught
in the single transaction whose parties, for reasons sufficient unto
themselves, decide that the payment should be made before the
goods themselves are delivered. Contract is a private form of
sovereignty for the parties, and their joint decision of the proper allocation of rights and responsibilities carries the day even if other
knowledgeable parties facing a similar problem choose to structure
their rights and liabilities differently.l*
Yet even if freedom of contract is rejected as a principle of social
organization, the role of custom is at best obscure. The contractual
provisions rejected on grounds of adhesion or inequality of bargaining power or on grounds of unconscionability are often both customary on the one hand and explicitly adopted by agreement on the
other. The ubiquity of a given term within this framework may be
taken with equal enthusiasm to indicate the widespread utility of
certain contractual practices, or, from a more skeptical theoretical
orientation, may be taken as evidence of the pervasive and illicit
l7 Although this discussion is largely confined to the use of custom in the
context of accidental injury or property damage case, the question can arise in
many other contexts. See, for example, Pierson v. Post. 3 Cai. R. 175, 2 Am.
Dec. 264 (lSOS), where a majority of the court rejected the customary hot pursuit rule between rival fox hunters in favor of a rule that required actual capture
or something very close to it in order to establish ownership of an unowned
fox. For an analysis of the case, see Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the
Root of Title, 13 Ga. L. Rev. 1221 (1979).
I8 See for example Les Affreteurs Reunis SociCtC Anonyme v. Leopold
Walford, Ltd. [1919] Ak. 801, 809 (rejecting proposition that custom may be
given effect “when entirely inconsistent with the plain words of an agreement
into which commercial men, certainly acquainted with so well-known a custom, have nevertheless thought proper to enter”).
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power of landlords, employers, manufacturers, or sellers of all sizes
and descriptions. Within this new regulatory world there is, if anything, even less place for custom to legitimate common practice or
to allay the deep-seated suspicions about the entire process of contractual formation.
What, then, about the place of custom in the law of tort? Here
it is possible to adopt any one of a number of positions, all of which
(as will become clear later) have some support in the case law. Some
nineteenth century decisions regard custom and ordinary practice as
the “unbending test” of negligence; others regard customary practice
as wholly irrelevant to the question of negligence, at least for those
practices that a court is willing to condemn as obviously dangerous;19
and there is a vast and dominant middle ground that treats
compliance with custom as useful and relevant evidence of negligence but not as dispositive-the position perhaps most eloquently
articulated in The T.J Hooper itself.20 Custom, then, is a factor that
must be taken into account in property, contract, and tort, but its
role is fuzzy and uncertain. The question is how the analysis may be
sharpened.
Starting with the consensual situation, I draw on an assumption
that I shall not defend here: that contracts should normally be enforced in the absence of fraud, duress, or incompetence.21 Within
that framework, custom has a role, even if it is subordinate, as noted
lg The early Pennsylvania cases were the most notable exponents of this
position. See, for example, Titus v. Bradford, Bordell & Kinuza Railroad Co.,
136 Pa. 618, 20 A. 517 (1890); Ke hl er v. Schwenk, 144 Pa. 348, 22 A. 910
(1901); Cunningham v. Fort Pitt Bridge Works, 197 Pa. 625, 47 A. 846
(1901). These cases were heartily disapproved in Morris, supra note 10, at n.2,
n.29; see also cases at n.36.
2O Id. at n.1 offers a long list of cases that takes what was by his time
clearly the dominant view. Interestingly enough, The T.J. Hoofer is not cited

on that list, nor anywhere in his hugely influential article on the subject of
custom and negligence that champions this view. See also, the quotation from
Harper, James, & Gray, supra note 2.
z1 For an earlier defense, see Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A
Critical Reappraisal, 18 J. Law & Econ. 293 (1975). There are further complications with freedom of contract that arise when there is the question of coordination and the risk of holdout among multiple actors, but those are not pursued here.
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above,22 to expressions of individual choice in contractual agreements. The role for custom is critical because while persons have the
right to draw up complete contingent-state contracts if they see fit,
they are under no duty to do so: for reasons of cost and convenience,
they may see fit to draft these contracts in ways that do not cover all
possibilities. In many cases their decision rests upon the conscious
judgment that the contingency involved is so sufficiently remote
that it is cheaper to work through unanticipated difficulties after
they arise than it is to plan imperfectly for them in advance. Knowing when to quit is often the first virtue of a conscientious draftsman. But while much academic discussion is directed to the case of
the remote and improbable contingency, by definition these will occur only a tiny fraction of the time; while disputes of this sort may
lurk large in the decided cases, 23 they do not lurk nearly as large in
the overall scheme of contracting and business behavior.
The far more important role for custom rests in those common
cases where the parties are able at low cost to specify particular terms
and then must decide whether to do so. In these situations the custom or standard practice of the trade performs two useful and related
functions. First, it gives guidance as to the terms that should be
specifically included in agreements. While some situations are
unique and known to be such, businessmen have little desire to revel
in the rights of individuation allowed them under the law or to risk
litigation. They will, if given the choice, cast a novel business deal in
a traditional legal framework To say that a clause in a certain contract is “standard” is not normally to convict businessmen of the
charge of lack of imagination or originality. Instead that outcome is
greeted with sighs of relief that uncertainty does not suffuse one aspect of a complicated transaction, freeing limited resources to deal
with those aspects of the deal that need special attention. Standardization is a blessed state of safety to those who can achieve it, for the
party that may not know the ins and outs of a particular transaction
can now rest in relative comfort on the knowledge that others with
greater experience and knowledge have adopted a pattern of doing
22 See note 16, supra.
23 For one reasoned discussion of the remote contingency, see Clayton P.
Gilette, Commercial Relationships and the Selection of Default Rules for Remote Risks, 19 J. Legal Stud. 535 (1990).
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business on which he can sensibly free ride. Custom is a socially desirable form of free riding that offers a cheap and reliable source of
information about a form of agreement that is worthy of use because
of the impersonality and universality of its origins. It may be possible
to rig a given transaction; it is much more difficult to rig an industry-wide custom.
’ Second, a confident sense that the custom within the trade will
become the norm in any future dispute allows people to dispense
with the costs of drafting particular clauses in the first place. Even
the inclusion of contract terms noted above is costly because the
parties-or, more ominously, one of the parties-has- to make sure
that the term proposed as standard for the trade is, in fact, standard
in that trade. It may be possible in principle to allow incorporation
of a given term into a contract and then to seek to set it aside on the
ground that the other party behaved fraudulently or perhaps negligently in stating that this term was common to the trade when in
fact it was not. But no person in his right mind would rely upon so
weak a legal claim in planning a legal transaction. Explicit terms
must be known to be those customary to the trade. Therefore,
putting no term in the agreement (or one that says custom shall
control in the event of dispute) in some circumstances may be both
cheaper and more reliable-than putting in any express term, if both
parties know that in the event of some subsequent dispute the customary term will be implied. Should a dispute arise, then each side
can find out what that custom is and in most cases receive the same
answer. A costly front-end inquiry over the full array of contractual
terms in every case is thereby averted at the far lower cost of ascertaining how the relevant contractual provision works in the much
less likely event that something goes wrong. It is, of course, possible
for parties to adopt intermediate approaches, specifying some terms
and leaving others to custom, in which case the two should be integrated as carefully as possible. 24 But the success of all contracting
strategies is enhanced if customary terms do exist-itself no legal or
moral necessity-and if parties can be confident that courts will reliably apply that custom to their future disputes.
24 See for example Produce Brokers Co. Ltd. v. Olympia Oil and Cake
Co. Ltd., il916] 1 A.C: 314.
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III. WHY CUSTOM EMERGES
With all this said, it remains to ask why customs evolve and why
anyone would choose to rely on them in the first place: just because
something has always been done does not necessarily mean that it
has always been done correctly. What must be shown is that there is
a strong set of incentives that leads custom to succeed. In this discussion. I confine my attention to customs arising out of consensual
arrangements and ignore those that impose costs on strangers. In
dealing with these consensual arrangements, it is necessary to take
into account two separate variables. First, we must have some information about whether the parties to the transaction have identical
or different roles. Second, we must know something about the frequency and severity of the loss that will be allocated in the event of
breach or mishap.
Roughly speaking, the following two generalizations hold. First,
where the parties have identical or parallel roles in a transaction, a
custom is more likely to emerge than in those cases where the parties
assume asymmetrical roles. Second, customs will tend to emerge in
cases where the contingency arises with relatively high frequency
and where relatively little turns on each application of the rule. The
key conditions then are reciprocity and high frequency. Where only
one of these conditions is present, the likelihood of a viable custom
forming will diminish proportionately. Where neither is present a
custom is not likely to emerge. The most difficult question to answer is whether the customs that emerge under these different circumstances should be treated with equal dignity by the law, to
which the answer is (although this point could be disputed) probably
yes. The differences in context will tend to go to the likelihood that
the custom will emerge more than to the strength or clarity of the
custom. If a custom does form when circumstances are adverse to its
development, then chances are that the issue is sufficiently important that it should be respected in any event, given the difficulty
of framing alternative standards of care. The problem should not,
however, be all consuming because the vast bulk of customs will
emerge in repetitive settings where their clarity and power is likely to
be strong. Virtually none of the case law on custom is directed to
weak customs. The key question, then, is what are the determinants
for a customary practice to develop within a consensual situation?
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Beginning with the first factor, identical roles for the parties increase the likelihood that a durable and sound custom will emerge.
Customs do not arise from conscious introduction, but from
widespread imitation and adaptation of past practice. The lack of
determinate origin is one feature that sharply distinguishes customs
from statutory norms. Start with a large community of individuals
who engage randomly in bilateral transactions with each other.
Those parties occupy identical roles in these transactions, so it is
hard for either of them to engage in opportunistic behavior that
provides overall private gain at the expense of the trading partner.
Thus, so long as some general rule has to be adopted, each party must
calculate the relative magnitudes of the short-term gain from the
immediate transaction, relative to the long term-losses from adopting an inferior rule in future transactions.25 Since the roles of the
two parties are identical-say both are merchants in the same market-a general rule that offers one side benefits today is almost certain to work against the winning party in some future transaction.
For one party, short-term and long-term gains will coincide; for the
other they may not. For the large mass of neutral but interested
third parties working in the field-including fellow traders, arbitrators, or industry experts-all that matters is the long-term institutional gain, and not the distribution of gains and losses in the immediate transaction. There is therefore a constant incentive shared
by all parties to get the rule right. But there is only a short-term interest of one party to get it wrong and even that will not dominate
his conduct if his private long-term losses outweigh these shortterm gains. The more stable the general environment, and the
longer the time horizons, the more likely it is that all parties will
seek the optimum rule. The greater number of repeat plays (a consequence implied by the stable environment) will allow convergence to
take place by trial and error, hint and modification, the tools in the
kit bag of custom.
Where the parties assume asymmetrical roles, the tendency to
seek the correct customary solution is somewhat weaker. To be sure,
it is always possible in principle to allocate the losses from a given
contingency in one direction, thereafter making adjustments in a
25 Benjamin Klein 8c Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in
Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. Pol. Econ. 615 (1981).
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cash term in order to offset the difference. But with parties in
asymmetrical roles, someone has to compute the frequency and
severity of the loss in order to determine the appropriate level of the
financial adjustment, which may well vary from party to party and
case to case. That variation undercuts the mechanism of automatic
in-kind offset otherwise available when parties do have identical
roles. These valuation problems are a constant source of potential
error and doubtless. create some incentive for any given party to seek
to resolve the dispute at hand in his own favor, leaving the financial
adjustments to a later day. The tendency of individual parties is not
buffered by the larger groups of which they are a part because the
trading community is likely to be divided along the same fault line
(wholesaler and retailer) as the parties to the individual transaction.
The bargaining and information problems that emerge when roles
are asymmetrical are likely to retard the introduction of a custom and
to weaken its strength. It will take a greater number of repeat plays
and a larger relevant community for a custom to take hold-if it takes
hold at all. But by the same token, the problem of asymmetry does
not doom to failure the emergence of viable custom, for there are
strong efficiency gains to all concerned if the correct custom can
emerge. All that can be said, therefore, is that in equilibrium fewer
customs should appear. It need not follow that the customs that do
emerge are less likely to work than those that emerge in the settings
where the parties occupy identical roles.
Looking to the second point, the role of the frequency and
severity of breach, there are four polar cases that have to be considered, Essentially there is a two-by-two matrix with frequency and
severity taking both high and low values. In the simplest model, we
can assume that the severity in any individual case is roughly of the
same order, either high or low, so that one does not have to ask how
the custom would look when some instances yield high losses and
the others low ones. In general, the greater the skew in the distribution, the more difficult it will be for custom to emerge.
A. Case 1: High Frequency, Low Severity

The easiest case for custom to emerge is probably that where the
frequency of the problem is high and the amount at stake is low.
The high frequency level means that the parties are likely to have a
lot of experience or instances on which to test and retest the judg-
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ment of custom. Since the stakes involved in each individual case are
small, the tendency to deviate from the successful equilibrium on
either side will be low, relative to the future gains from keeping the
relationship alive. The custom falls into a class of self-enforcing
contracts. If there is $1,000 at stake in a given case, and generating
the right rule yields overall gains of $IO,OOO per party, both sides will
opt for the superior rule. The party in the right gets $11,000 ($1,000
+ $10,000) and the party in the wrong still gets $9,000 (- $I,OOO +
$ro,ooo). Both are better off with the same rule. As before, where
the parties are in symmetrical roles, equilibrium should occur more
rapidly, but the asymmetrical roles should not preclude the emergence of a stable and sensible equilibrium, although it will make the
occurrence somewhat less probable.
B. Case 2: High Frequency, High Severity

In one sense, this situation should not differ in principle from
the previous one. So long as there are lots of plays, the ratio between
the immediate gains to any party and the long-term value of having
the right rule should remain relatively invariant, and, therefore, we
should expect to see the proper rule- emerge-more quickly if the
parties occupy symmetrical roles in the relationship. It is as though a
zero were added to each of the numbers of the example above.
Nonetheless, some complications could emerge. First, the increased
size of the dispute means that the issue has greater importance for
the parties governed by the custom, who in turn should be expected
to press more quickly to reach the correct outcome. Their speed will
be hastened because the utility of the custom is measured not only by
the accidents or disputes that it controls, but by the frequency of the
accidents or disputes that it averts. So long as the risk of accident is a
constant theme, as it surely was for both mines and rails (the major
source of nineteenth century institutional tort cases), the true frequency level is measured by preoccupation and not by accident.
Nonetheless, there are still obstacles to the emergence of custom.
The immediate players may be so preoccupied by the size of the
stakes in their own transaction (which in the limit could be a rule or
ruin situation) that they will not possess the long time horizon that
allows relational gains to soften the desire for immediate success.
There may be a tendency, for example, to resort to lawyers instead of
private and informal accommodation, and nothing kills the emer-
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gence of custom like the active intervention of an external legal system replete with its own extensive norms and powerful vested interests. The insistent demand to defend and rationalize behaviors
and preferences places an enormous premium on verbal acuity and
relatively little on experience and judgment. The skilled lawyer can
make a better public statement on any issue than the practitioner of
the art whose knowledge is practical but not formal. The frontal
attacks on custom are likely to be met by defenses that are better in
substance than they are in appearance. The legal system may therefore disrupt customary practices. The relative strength of these factors is hard to assess in the abstract, and they may be sufficient to
prevent a custom from developing. Yet, from the point of a legal
system, it does not follow that the customs that do emerge in this
setting should be treated any less favorably than those that arise in
other ones. It is merely strong evidence that this custom provides
sufficient gains to make it hardy enough to survive the legal intervention that might subvert it. The class of cases here is not unimportant, for injuries that arise during the course of employment fall
into this category. The asymmetrical roles of the parties and the
large if frequent size of the stakes could prevent the custom for
emerging or could lead a court (as will become evident) to view with
deep suspicion any custom that does emerge.
C. Case 3: Low Frequency, Low Severity

In this situation it is quite likely that no custom will emerge at
all. The relative importance of the issue is, as a first approximation,
measured by the product of the two numbers, which will be small
given that both the components are small. Here the tendency will
be, perhaps, to expand the size of the community to which one
looks for guidance or for the issues to simply be resolved in a quick
off-handed way since neither side has a large stake, present or. future,
in the issue.
D. Case 4: Low Frequency, High Severity

Again the situation is one in which the custom is not likely to
emerge given that any party to the suit will see that the losses from
the immediate transaction are larger than the potential gains from
maintaining a relationship. The result should hold whether or not
the roles are symmetrical, although the threshold frequency needed
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for the custom to emerge should, as before, be lower when the parties have symmetrical roles than when they do not.
On balance, therefore, the key variables on the emergence of
custom seem to be the symmetry of results and the frequency of the
dispute with the question of severity of loss playing a secondary role.
Important in&cations flow from the interaction of these distinctions. We should predict that custom will be strongest and most
durable in ordinary transactions between merchants where the sums
at stake in any individual case are small relative to the goodwill at
stake for long-term players in the business.26 It should be easier to
fashion rules that govern the position between traders, that is, those
who buy on some occasions and sell on others but always in the
same market, than it is to fashion customary rules for persons who
buy in one market only to resell in another-distributors or retailers,
for example-or persons who are always one side of the transaction-lenders or borrowers, physicians or patients. Similarly, detailed
customs are likely to be robust when there are thousands of repeat
transactions-purchases and sales or a given exchange, for example-and when they take more time to emerge. They will perhaps
be weaker where there are isolated large losses, as with employer liability, medical malpractice, and product liability cases arising out of
a consensual arrangement. Ordinary personal injury cases are perhaps
the greatest test for custom because they involve infrequent large
losses and asymmetrical roles.
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CUSTOM
AND DUE CARE BEFORE THE T.J HOOPER
The development of the common law of custom before The TJ
Hooper took place in large measure in ignorance of the analytical
factors that indicate whether a custom will prove to be either stable
or desirable. Instead, judges relied largely on a patchwork of common sense and precedent to inch toward what they regarded as the
correct solution. Most judges knew at some level that custom could
not be decisive in all cases, an intuition that (given the risks of externalities) is surely correct. By the same token, judges often did not
26 The P ower of custom between merchants is reflected in the weight it receives under the Uniform Commercial Code; see, for example, U.C.C. §l-
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perceive the circumstances that rendered the adherence to custom a
suspect legal norm. The cases themselves tend to divide into three
basic classes.27 There are some cases in which evidence of custom is
regarded as inadmissible on the question of due care. At the other
extreme are cases that treat custom as the “unbending” test of negligence. Then there is a third class of cases, the most famous of which
are relied on in The ZYJ Hoofer, that take the dominant middle position that custom is evidence of due care but not conclusive on that
issue.
The very diversity of opinion should give pause to those who
think that “the” law of negligence during the nineteenth century
tended to converge on efficient results. Given the persistent and
enormous variation in legal approaches to custom, there is every
reason to be confident that at least one of the approaches was inefficient even if we cannot identify which one it is. Thus the courts of
Pennsylvania tended to be conspicuous champions of the “unbending” rule that was rejected in other large industrial states and in the
Supreme Court. It is doubtful that there is any local explanation that
makes this rule fit for analyzing negligence cases there but not elsewhere. Instead, genuine differences in ideology and perception best
account for the differences in substantive approaches.
There is also good reason to believe that the best approach on
the subject was the one that was least favored in its own time--that
which treated custom as the unbending test of negligence, at least
for the workplace injuries it governed before the advent of the
workers’ compensation laws. In this section, I examine these earlier
precedents cited in T6e T.J Hooper in some detail because the blackletter propositions for which they are customarily cited take on a very
different aspect when placed in their factual and procedural context.
I cannot say that I have read all the nineteenth century cases. but I
have read a fair number and can rely on accounts given by others as
well. Certainly there is nothing in the account of Clarence Morris
or the standard textbook writers of the time that contradicts the basic impression. The cases cited in The T.J Hooper seem to be representative of the larger whole, and several of them have proved influ27The tripartite division is recognized and adopted in Harper, James, &
Gray, supra note 2, at 581, which notes that the divisions were greater in the
earlier cases than they are today.
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ential in their own right in transmitting the common law of negligence. Looking closely at these cases, one powerful irony clearly
emerges that should be stated at the outset: notwithstanding all the
suspicion that is heaped upon custom as a standard of due care, the
major nineteenth century cases reveal scant evidence of inefficient
customs arising out of consensual evidence.
A. Outright Rejection of Custom
Romana C. MayQew v. Sdhan Mining Co.28 is perhaps the

nineteenth century case most hostile to the equation of custom with
due care. The plaintiff, an independent contractor, fell thirty-five
feet through a bucket hole cut in a mine and suffered serious injury.
On orders from the defendant’s superintendent, a hole had been cut
without giving notice to the plaints, it was not surrounded by a rail
or other barrier, nor lighted or marked in any way that gave notice
to the plaintiff In order to show that it had taken “average ordinary
care,” the defendant sought to ask the superintendent (as a combination fact and expert witness) whether he had “ever seen a ladderhole in a mine, below the surface, with a railing around it,” and if it
was “feasible” to use a ladder-hole in that condition.29 The court
held that the decision to exclude these questions was proper in terms
that left little to the imagination.
If the defendants had proved that in every mining establishment that has existed since the days of Tubal-Cain, it
has been the practice to cut ladder-holes in their platforms,
situated as this was while in daily use for mining operations, without guarding or lighting them, and without
notice to contractors or workmen, it would have no. tendency to show that the act was consistent with ordinary
prudence or a due regard for the safety of those who were
using their premises by their invitation. The gross carelessness of the act appears conclusively upon its recital. Defendants’ counsel argue that “if it should appear that they
rarely had railings, then it tends to show no want of ordinary care in that respect,” that “if one conforms to custom
he is so far exercising average ordinary care.” The argu28 76 Me. 100 (1884).
29 Id. at 111.
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ment proceeds upon an erroneous idea of what constitutes
ordinary care. “Custom” and “average” have no proper place
in its ‘definition?
Strong stuff indeed. But it is necessary to disentangle the many
cross currents contained in this brief passage. It appears as though
the defendant’s testimony was designed to explain why railings were
never put around holes. That custom itself might be easily justified
on the ground that the -railings themselves were dangerous obstacles
that could cause injury to others working on the floor-an alternative hazard that should be taken into account in any reckoning of
the utility or wisdom of the practice. If this is so, then the exclusion
from evidence denies the jury the chance to understand what the
practice is, and why it might be the case. Indeed, if the custom was
widespread, there is good reason not to require the explanation at
all.31 This argument, however, is not sufficient to allow the defendant to carry its case in its entirety, for it does not dispose of the
question of whether there was a duty to give notice to the plaintiff
of the new bucket holes in the mine floor. The plaintiff was an independent contractor, who, unlike regular employees, might not be
expected to have notice of what takes place in the mine on a daily
basis. It appears (absent custom to the contrary) that the cost of
notifying the plaintiff is low, and that there is no custom not to
notify independent contractors entering the mine of new hazards.
The plaintiff might well have won by showing that there was no
custom of the trade that precluded the recovery.
The opinion, however, does not concede the dominance of
custom only to show its inapplicability to the case at hand. Rhetorically, it takes a very different stance. The court states that its own
general appreciation of what is or is not dangerous practice is sufficient to exclude the evidence altogether. But, if there were in fact a
universal custom, then why should courts find it unsuitable? The
tendency of consensual arrangements to optimize the joint welfare
of the parties is neither mentioned nor appreciated; nor does the
court in Mayhew have any sense that, so long as safety is a
paramount issue in a mine, customs usually tend to work to minimize the extent of the potential losses from all sources associated
3o Id at 112.
31 See paragraph after note 66, infia, in the text.
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with its operation. The omnipresent risk of accident and its frequent
occurrence make this a high frequency/high loss situation.
A number of other nineteenth century cases have followed a
similar rule, but their context is wholly different, for typically the
custom is set up by its practitioners as a defense against strangers to
the trade. Once the plaintiff is not part of the group that sets the
custom, the evident risk is that the custom will evolve to meet the
standards of the members of the group and not the outsiders who
are harmed by it. Taken to its extreme, the uniform practice of slavery does not offer a customary justification relative to the slaves
whose interests are suppressed by the custom in whose formation
they played no part. Many of the other cases that exclude the use of
the custom are indeed stranger cases of this sort. Thus in Basset v.
Shares,32 the defendant teamsters left their horses unattended under
a building then being constructed. The horses bolted when
frightened by some falling materials, and they ran into the plaintiffs
horse that was standing hitched on a public highway. Here the
teamsters custom was treated as irrelevant within the negligence
system. “Until it was proved or admitted that the others in so doing
had acted with ordinary care, no valid inference could be drawn
from their conduct that the defendant in imitating it had acted with
ordinary care, and so the evidence excluded was irrelevant.“33
The same result in Bassett is reached by following a rule of strict
liability in stranger cases such that the issue of negligence, and thus
that of custom, is irrelevant to the outcome; hence the connection
between the two questions central to tort liability: the choice between strict liability and negligence and the role of custom and costbenefit analysis in negligence cases.34 The ubiquity of the negligence
standard in so many nineteenth century settings, however, made
this course impossible to follow. Courts that had the strong instinct
that something was awry within the system perceived the analytic
error as the connection from custom to negligence, when the error
lay in the connection between negligence and liability. The great
attraction of negligence, relative to strict liability, is that it looks like a
principle applicable to all cases, no matter what the setting. Strict
32 63

COM. 39,27 A. 421 (1893).
33 Id. at 43.
34 See text at beginning of Section I, supra.
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liability for its part generally seems (and is) manifestly inappropriate
in many consensual situations (licenses, invitees, and medical
malpractice, 35 for example) Hence a strict liability rule cannot
pretend to the universality of negligence.
Analytically, the seeming universality of negligence rules comes
at a high conceptual price. So long as negligence is required to do
double duty in both stranger and consensual settings, then a court is
likely to vacillate in setting rules for determining the standard of
care: the schizophrenic attitude toward custom is an unintended
consequence of the theoretical overgeneralization of the reach of the
negligence principle. What is striking about the cases, however, is
that they never advert to the distinction between consensual and
stranger-cases, even though its use should be instinctive if the common law were as efficient as its chief defenders have so often
claimed.36 The pattern in Bassett is repeated in the other cases in
which custom has (rightly) received short shrift. Short of liability,
the railroads have little incentive to take into account the injuries
suffered by small children who play about their turntables. So long
as some duty of care is owed to the trespassing child,37 then setting
35 For an earlier discussion of this point, see Richard A. Epstein, Medical
Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 87 (1976).
36 Landes & Posner, supra note 13, recognize the analytical weaknesses in
the logic of The T.J Hooper, but try to wish it away by noting that some of the
cases that cite it do not do so for the relationship between custom and negligence, but this is whistling in the dark. Many of those cases cite The T.J.
Hoofer for just this proposition, and those that do not often cite the other
leading cases, almost too numerous to count, that stand for the same proposition. It is difficult to see how the common law of torts could be regarded as
“efficient” when it obscures the consensual/stranger distinction so essential to
the economic analysis of the subject. The point is positive and normative.
37 Railroad Company v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1873) is perhaps
the most influential of these cases. At one time I was quite skeptical of the rule
allowing trespassing children to recover against the neighboring landowners,
see Richard A. Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict
Liability, 3 J. Legal Stud. 165, 201-12 (1974), but, on that question at least, I
have somewhat mellowed and think that the potential gains from having all
landowners take modest precautions provides general compensation for the loss
of the exclusive rights in land, at least if the duties are not set so high as to
discourage parental involvement and supervision. The relatively strict standards on liability to child trespassers found in the Restatement may be messy in
principle (see Restatement, supra note 14, at 5339, on attractive nuisance), but
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that standard of care cannot be decided solely bv reference to custom. Within this framework, a legal rule requiring independent evidence of due care is appropriate whenever railroad turntables are left
unlocked where children frequently play.38
B. Custom as the Unbending Test of Due Care

The second possibility of the relationship between custom and
negligence is that compliance with custom is conclusive evidence of
due care in a particular case. This standard has its greatest attraction
in consensual situations, owing to the absence of externalities. Historically, just as the Maine Court in Mayhew refused to take custom
into account at all, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, most notably
in Titus V. Bradford, Bordell & Kinuza Railroad Co.,39 took exactly
the opposite point of view. The decedent in that case rode as a
brakeman on “trucks” that were used to transfer certain cars from
broad to narrow gauge rails. The dangers of the occupation were
obvious to all concerned, and the decedent had worked in the yard
for some months before he took the position in which he met his
death. On the fatal occasion, the standard procedures for fastening
the trucks to the narrow beds had been observed, but the decedent
was killed while trying to jump off a truck that had separated from
its bed. The plaintiffs negligence action attacked the entire practice
of transferring trucks from broad to narrow beds. In language as
resolute as that found in Mayhew, but with opposite import, the
court rebuffed that attack with two answers: custom and assumption
of risk
All the cases agree that the master is not bound to use the
newest and best appliances. He performs his duty when he
furnishes those of ordinary character and reasonable safety,
and the former is the test of the latter; for, in regard to the
style of implement or nature of the mode of performance
of any work, “reasonably safe” means safe according to the
usages, habits, and ordinary risks of the business. Absolute
it seems to be a compromise that has caused no real dislocation in practice-a
point that cannot be made about the modern rules of medical malpractice and
product liability.
38 See for example, The Ilwaco Railway & Navigation Co. v. Hedrick, 1
Wash. 448,25 P. 335 (1890).
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safety is unattainable, and employers are not insurers. They
are liable for the consequences, not of danger but of negligence; and the unbending test of negligence in methods,
machinery, and appliances is the ordinary usage of the
business. . . . Juries must necessarily determine the responsibility of individual conduct, but they cannot be allowed to
set up a standard which shall, in effect, dictate the customs
or control the business of the community. . . .40
This conclusion was reinforced by stressing the intimate connection between custom and assumption of risk. The decedent’s
knowledge of the business meant that his “was a perfectly plain case
of acceptance of an employment, with full knowledge of the risks.“41
The rule in Titus, echoed in subsequent Pennsylvania cases, has
sometimes been taken as representative of the dominant view of its
time, most notably by Landes and Posner,42 but their reading is incorrect. That rule was not well received in the literature that proceeded The T.J Hooper. Thus one thoughtful 1916 article put the
objection to Titus as follows.
The harmful results that would in all probability follow the
adoption of the common usage, and the safe results that
would be assured by the substitution of a different method
might, in a particular case, be so apparent that a prudent
man would reject the former, and adopt the latter course.
But in doing this he would depart from the rule laid down
by the “unbending test”’ and of his own accord adopt the
wiser and safer rule. Yet the rule of the “unbending test”
constrains him to adopt the unsafe method in order to
bring himself within the rule and escape the charge of
negligence.43
39 136 Pa., su.ra note 19, followed in the cases noted id.
4o 136 Pa at 626; 20 A.517 at 518.
41 136 Pa: at 627; 20 A.517 at 518.
42 See Landes & Posner, supra note 13, at 137 and n.31, where they incorrectly treat Titus as representing the dominant nineteenth century view,
which it did not. They do not discuss Maynard, McDaniel, or Mayhew.
43 Henry R. Miller, Jr. The So-Called Unbending Test of Negligence, 3
Va. L. Rev. 537, 543 (1915).

RICHARD EPSTEIN ON THE T.J. HOOPER

25

The passage contemplates a world in which the Titus rule disfunctionally locks the parties into an inferior safety equilibrium: every firm is safe if it adheres to custom, and each risks liability if it deviates from it, even for the better. Why would any firm adopt safer
practices if it led to greater liabilities? The Pennsylvania rule therefore was said to place a ceiling as well as a minimum on effort. But
the criticism is misplaced for two reasons. First, historically, there is
no evidence that custom showed the rigidity on innovation that is
attributed to it in the quoted passage. Firms, with a commendable
desire to compete for labor, were willing to offer above average
safety-conditions, with a lower level of anticipated risk, in order to
attract workers. One can contract out of custom explicitly. Second,
the rule itself makes it clear that deviations toward greater care are
acceptable, by noting that some employers sometimes do supply
higher level of safety, and face no legal obstacle in so doing. There is
no implicit prisoner’s dilemma game in treating custom as the unbending test of due care.
The harder question, whether the firm should be bound to the
higher standards that it selected, was itself an issue during the last
part of the nineteenth century, and there was at least some sentiment that private rules of conduct established by employers for their
own workers are inadmissible in evidence in a negligence case because the “fallaciousness and unfairness” of that rule stems from its
effect, as Judge Mitchell of the Minnesota court insisted, “that, the
more cautious and careful a man is in the adoption of rules in the
management of his business in order to protect others, the worse he
is off, and the higher the degree of care he is bound to exercise.“44
But on this point Mitchell, one of the greatest nineteenth century
judges, seems to misfire. If the defendant is able to persuade workers
to take jobs or patrons to frequent premises on the footing’ that
greater precautions will be taken, then he should be held to that individuated standard: the reduced cost of labor or the increased price
from customers should be sufficient to fund the additional liability if
the precautions are worth taking. So long therefore as these rules are
used to induce customers to come in the defendant’s direction, then
170

44 Fonda v St Paul City Railway Co., 61 Minn. 435, 438, 74 N.W. 166,
(1895).
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the private action based on the higher standard allows the defendant
to make its own promises credible.
Titus, however, deals with the situation where no such representation, express or implied, was made. Indeed there is a sense in
which the case should not be regarded as one that is governed by
custom at all, given the explicit individuated assumption of risk
found in the alternative holding of the case. That assumption of risk
defense should, if supported by the evidence, dominate even if the
evidence of custom across the industry was to the contrary. It should
govern even if the circumstances of this railroad were sufficiently
unique (because no other transferred cars from broad’ to narrow
beds) to preclude any industry-wide custom. The assumption of risk
defense precludes the need for any appeal to custom. The conflict
between a general custom and particular contract should be resolved
in favor of the contract.
In this case, however, no conflict appears, and custom and assumption of risk have a cumulative effect in favor of the defendant.
Given that these two functioned in unison, the court ‘in Titus
reached the correct outcome even if it had a profusion of favorable
rationales. There is a sharp distinction between a lawsuit that challenges the conduct in a particular case because it deviates from the
custom on which it rests and one that challenges the custom to
which the defendant conforms. The effort to take on this second
line of inquiry was, and is, vastly larger than the first, and courts resisted the temptation not only in common law actions for negligence but also in the early English cases under the Employer’s Liability Act of 1880, when this precise question recurred:5 when the
question of assumption of risk was also paramount.46 Indeed, it is
just the unwillingness to observe this distinction that marks the shift
45 This invitation was rejected, with much division of opinion, in the
English cases that construed the Employer’s Liability Act of 1880. One issue
litigated under the act was whether the concept of defect stretched far enough to
allow an attack on designs that were dangers on the one hand, but in common
use on the other. See, for example, Walsh v. Whiteley, 21 O.B.D. 371 (1888).
On the general effect of the statute, see, Richard A. Epstein, The Historical
Origins and Economic Structure of the Workers’ Compensation Laws, 18 Ga.
L. Rev. 775 (1982).
46 See, for example, Thomas v. Quartermaine, 18 QB.D. 685 (1887);
Joseph Smith v. Baker & Sons, [1891] A.C. 325.
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from the traditional design defect cases based upon a narrow conception of product defect and the newer actions under the
risk/utility banner that allow one to challenge the practice as well as
the case,47 a decision that also took place in an environment in
which the assumption of risk defense was greeted with suspicion
and hostility.
The substantive differences between the two approaches-custom and cost-benefit-are enormous. When custom is used, the
courts can, in effect, function in a reactive fashion, relying on the
practices formulated by those who have powerful incentives to get
things right because of the daily peril in which they labor. Although
the roles of the parties are asymmetrical in any employer liability
case, the constant risk to safety should work to drive parties to the
best approach to the inherent dangers of the work. The effort to
second guess what a business has done requires a court to look with
deep suspicion on the one source of information with a built-in tendency to reliability and to substitute its, or a jury’s, judgment of what
is prudent and what is not for the judgment of those in the field,
even though it has inferior knowledge and a weaker incentive to get
things right. Cases like Titus do not reveal a situation in which the
parties are indifferent to the question of safety. They reveal cases in
which some precautions are-taken and others are not, which is
consistent with a world in which additional precautions may have
both hidden dangers of their own and may cost more to introduce
than they are worth.
There is no conflict in ultimate objective between a cost-benefit
analysis that treats custom as evidence and one that treats it as conclusive on the question of due care. The entire debate is over the
question of the rate of convergence: Does one get to the due care
standard more quickly and more cheaply with one approach than
with the other? The argument for Titus has a strong Hayekian cast,
concerned as it is with the importance of decentralized sources of
1
47 For the modern point of view, see, for example, Barker v. Lull Engineering Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 43, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978), with
its heavy reliance on the balancing tests found in John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973), a hugely
influential article that brought the risk/utility analysis to center stage in the
products area.
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information,48 in that custom is both the more reliable and cheaper
way to set standards of care where information is costly and juries
themselves are prey to biases. The constant preference toward the
position most persuasively championed in T.J. Huuper rests upon a
view of the world that both stresses and exaggerates the weakness of
custom, without recognizing the costliness and uncertainty of caseby-case deliberations that fly in the teeth of uniform practice. There
is a tendency to say that custom should yield as the ability to collect
and analyze information in a systematic fashion increases. But the
same arguments have been made for centralized planning elsewhere
and have failed. The improved technology gives rise to opportunities
to confuse as well as to inform and offers no systematic promise of
any overall improvement in decisionmaking. The defense of custom
is not that it is certain, but that it is superior to any ex post reconstruction of the reasonable level of care that a judge or jury is likely to
undertake.
C. Custom as Evia’ence of Due Care

By far the largest group of nineteenth century cases adhere to
the line that was articulated with such eloquence by Learned Hand:
that custom is only evidence of the role of due care. In the course of
his opinion, Judge Hand cites four cases for the proposition that
custom is not conclusive evidence of due care: Maynard v. Buck,

Wabash Railway Co. 9.’ McDaniel& Texas & Pactftc Railway Co. v.
Bebymer, and Shandrew v. Chicago etc. RaiZway Co.49 Each case

contains general language that supports Hand’s proposition, but the
language in question takes on radically different significance when
placed in the the factual and procedural context of each case, for
none of these cases reveals any evidence on any inefficient custom
that has been counteracted by the use of general negligence standards.
1. A guestion of agency costs. Maynard v. Buc& arose out of a
contract for hire under which the defendant drover was responsible
for driving the plaintiffs two steers along the public highway toward
4.

48 For an excellent summary of Hayek’s position, see John Gray, Hayek
on Liberty 27-55 (2d ed. 1986).
49 100 Mass 40 (1868).9 107 U . S. 454 (1882); 189 U.S. 468 (1903); 142 F.

320 (8th Cir. 19b5).
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their destination as part of a larger herd of some 123 animals
entrusted to his care by various owners. He was assisted by two men
and a boy. There were two possible versions of how the cattle had
been lost. One was that the defendant had failed to exercise ordinary
care to see that the two steers were included in the original drive.sO
The second was that, after the drive had begun, several of the cattle,
including plaintiffs two steers, were frightened by a passing train,
and bolted from the herd, whereupon the drover decided to drive the
rest of his herd to its destination before returning to search for the
strays some two days later. Whatever the precise events, the plaintiffs two steers were not recovered, and suit was brought to recover
for their loss.
The instruction given to the jury, and found correct on appeal
provided that “the defendant ‘was bound to use the same care in regard to’ the cattle, which he undertook to drive for hire, ‘that men
of ordinary prudence would exercise over their own property under
the same circumstances.’ “51 The defendant had asked for an instruction that “if he did do the things that drovers of common prudence, engaged in the same business, ordinarily do, he was not guilty
of such negligence as will make him liable in this action.“52 The
following passage from Judge Wells’ judgment is the most frequently quoted.
What had been done by others previously, however uniform in mode it may be shown to have been, does not
make a rule of conduct by which the jury are to be limited
and governed. It is not to control the judgment of the jury,
if they see that in the case under consideration it is not
such conduct as a prudent man would adopt in his own
affairs, or not such as a due regard to the obligations of
those employed in the affairs of others would require them
to adopt. It is evidence of what is proper and reasonable to
be done, from which, together with all the other facts and
circumstances of the case, the jury are to determine
5o 100 Mass, supru note 49, at 46.
51 Id. at 47.
52 Id.
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whether the conduct in question in the case before them
was proper and justifiable.53
At one level, the decision in Maynard looks as though it is an
invitation for the court to decide to set standards for the business
that are different from those which the business sets for itself. As
such, it is consistent with the interventionist approach taken in The
T.J Hooper. But in reality, the context suggests a far narrower and
much more functional test of due care--one that adumbrates the
agency cost issue so dominant in modern law and economics.54 The
critical difference between the instructions offered by the plaintiff
and the defendant lay in a single point: the plaintiffs proposed
instruction looked at the question of optimal care from the point of
view of the single owner, (the care “that men of ordinary prudence
would exercise over their own property”) while the defendant’ s
proposed looked at the question of optimal care from the point of
view of “drovers of common prudence” working under a contract of
hire.55
The nub of the difference is that the single owner will seek to
minimize the sum of the costs of the lost cattle and the effort required to collect them because he bears the full cost of both. His
course of action, without legal intervention, attributes to all relevant
costs and attributes its appropriate (that is, full) social weight. The
drover for his part labors under an implicit conflict of interest in that
he bears all the costs of collecting the cattle, but receives none of the
gain when they are safely gathered. In principle, the perfect contract
is one that would require the drover to take the same level of care as
that single owner, but in a world of imperfect monitoring and contracting it is just possible that a custom could develop among drovers
that would allow them to slack off more than comparably situated
owners.
Recast in modern terms, the effect of the instruction given is to
advise the jury that it should ignore the agency-cost problem and ask
whether the drover would have followed strategy if the lost cattle
s3 Id. at 48.
54 For the initial exposition, see Michael C. Jensen & Wiiliam H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Mangerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership
Structure, 31 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976).
55 100 Mass l 9 supra note 49, at 47; emphasis added.
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had been his own-assuming of course that it found that the cattle
were lost in transit and not previously. Within this context, the
scope for this conflict of interest is narrow: the single owner knows
that if he continues to drive the remaining herd to safety, he will incur (as a first approximation) no further losses in the cattle retained
but an increased probability of the loss of those cattle that strayed.
Alternatively, if he stops to search for the missing cattle, he will delay the journey and increase the likelihood that some other cattle
will stray as well. Yet at the same time, he will increase the probability of recovering the two steers belonging to the plaintiff. A priori
there is no reason why a strategy of search first/drive later would increase the drover’s private costs above that of following the alternative strategy of drive first/search later. The implicit variation in the
relevant variables makes it doubtful that any single strategy would
minimize the losses from stray cattle and search time for the single
owner, let alone the drover. But even here the drover’s request for
instructions sought to control for the problem by noting that the
custom covered only “driving on routes from Brighton forty or fifty
miles therefrom, when one or a small number of cattle stray from
the drove and cannot be immediately found. . . .“56
There is a further irony here, for the custom at issue, far from
arising from a conflict of interest, may have worked to counter a
second conflict of interest that was not identified in the argument at
all: the plaintiffs, not owning the rest of the herd, had no incentive
to see that those animals were safely delivered before the search was
undertaken, whereas the defendant, being responsible for the whole
herd, did. The custom therefore might have sought to control a latent but important conflict between multiple principals of a single
agent.
What the jury thought is shrouded in mystery. The plaintiffs
verdict could have rested on the theoretically uninteresting point
that the cattle were wrongfully excluded from the herd at the outset
or on the more interesting ground that an implicit conflict of interest between owners and drovers really did matter. A verdict on
that last ground seems supportable given the early dismissal of the
two employees who were not paid to assist in the search for plaintiffs steers, but that verdict is not an attack on custom itself. The
56 100 Mass., sup-~ note 49, at 44.
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custom only provided that the search be made after the animals were
safely delivered. There was no custom that allowed a defendant to
slack off in his efforts after delivery. If the defendant would have
continued to employ the two men to search for his own steers, then
he should have continued to employ them to search for the plaintiffs.
No matter how all these refinements are resolved, however, the
deviation between custom and due care identified in Maynard goes
to the agency-cost question and to that alone. It does not permit, as
subsequent cases do, any jury to adopt a standard that seems to be
wise after the event, but that would not be adopted by either a
drover or an owner in the course of a drive. The gap between custom and due care reflects an intuitive sophistication of the principalagent problem, not a widespread or intuitive distrust of private contracts or ordinary markets in the round. In The T.J Hooper, Learned
Hand includes Maynard on the list of cases that support his broad
proposition that a whole calling may have lagged in the adoption of
needed precautions.57’ But the case is better understood when its
broad language is read in its functional context.
2. The Procedural Blunder. In Wabash RaiZway Co. v. McDaniels, 58 the plaintiff a brakeman employed by the defendant on
its train, was injured when two of the defendant’s trains crashed on
its track. The cause of the accident was the negligence of a youthful
telegraph operator on one of the defendant’s switches, a lad named
McHenry, who fell asleep one night at his position, allowed one of
the defendant’s trains to pass by unnoticed, and thus misled the defendant’s central dispatcher as to the location of the train before it
crashed. The railroad conceded that the servant was negligent
within the course of his employment and that this negligence was
the cause of the plaintiffs loss. The case presented difficulties only
because the plaintiff mishandled the common employment rule by
failing to take exception to the defendant’s requested instruction
that the fellow servant doctrine precluded the plaintiff from charging the railroad with McHenry’s negligence. The plaintiffs blunder
is transparent, as the applicable law recognized that the common
employment defense did not apply when the plaintiff and the negli57 60 f.2d, supra note 4
at 740
58 107
sup22 U.S.,note 49.
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gent servant were in “different departments” as was surely the case
here. If the right exceptions had been noted, the deadly combination of the ordinary rules of negligence and vicarious liability would
have made the case a sure thing for the plaintiff. There is no custom
that allows switch telegraphers-to sleep on the job.
The plaintiffs initial mistake left him with a far more difficult
task of recovery, for he had to persuade the court that the defendant’s “supervisory” negligence in hiring and training the worker
could support a judgment of liability. McHenry was a youth of about
seventeen years who had learned his trade as a telegraphic night operator from a fellow employee, whom he paid ten dollars a month
for instruction both before and after he assumed his telegrapher’s
position. This form of instruction was customary on the railroad,
and the Wabash, like other railroads, made it a practice to hire its
new telegraph operators from the ranks of its own messengers.59 In
this case it was undisputed that McHenry, whatever his failing in
this case, was bright and industrious and of good habits. The plaintiff received an instruction that the railroad could be found negligent
if it failed ordinary care, while the defendant was unable to obtain
an instruction that
the question of ordinary care is to be determined by the usages or custom which obtain in railroad management, and,
therefore, that proper inquiry is not what ought to be, but
what is, the general practice in the business; that what the
servant is presumed to know, and to have accepted as the
basis of his employment, is the practice or custom as it is
when, in hiring his services, he risks the dangers incident
to his employment. . . . 6o
The first Justice Harlan, writing for a unanimous court, sustained the instruction, noting that the plaintiff had little or no opportunity to influence or even observe the hiring practices in the
59 One of the night telegraph operators on the railroads was Thomas Edison, and he too fell asleep on the job, with near catastrophic consequences.
Edison also advanced through the same apprenticeship system described in
Wabash RaiZway. See Margaret Cousins, The Story of Thomas Alva Edison
46-48 (1965). (A Landmark children’s book that I read aloud with ‘my son
Benjamin, age nine.)
6o 107 U.S. supra note 49, at 458.
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telegraphic department: “ordinary” practice might describe what
happened, but it could not set the appropriate limits for the “proper
and great” level of prudence that is required.61 By taking this line, the
court used one error to cancel out a second. There is no question
that the issue of hiring custom would not have come up at all in a
suit by an injured passenger or if the plaintiffs lawyer had not
muffed his chance to invoke the different department exception to
the fellow servant doctrine. There is no evidence that the full complex of rules works badly in this context. So long as the rule of vicarious liability is in place, then the question of supervision and retention drops out of the case. The railroad that follows its own custom
is required to internalize all the costs of mistakes by its employee and
therefore will gravitate to efficient hiring and retention practices,
including having young workers pay for their own training. The
opinion gives no clue as to what was wrong with the custom that
was followed: yet from a distance it seems to make sense to bring
young workers up through the ranks, to observe their character,
ability, and work habits, and to know that they care enough about
their future to pay higher ranked workers for individual instruction.
Harlan’s opinion does not indicate what additional precaution the
jury found wanting or why its undisclosed view should be persuasive
in these circumstances. There is no evidence at all of any industry
lag, and the verdict for the plaintiff may represent only the jury’s attempt to hold the railroad responsible for the obvious negligence of
its employee.
3. Texas & Pacijic RaiZway Co. cu. Behymer. The second important Supreme Court case cited in The T.J Hooper is this short, elegant opinion of Justice Holmes that is best known for a single sentence. ‘What usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be
done, but what ought to be done is fixed by the standard of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is complied with or not.“62 As such,
the opinion does what Hand said it did by relegating custom to an
evidentiary role. But there was no evidence in the case of any real
tension between custom and due care; indeed there was no evidence
of any operative custom at all. The plaintiff brakeman was ordered
atop some cars standing in the yard and covered with ice (to release
61 Id at 460-61.
62 Sde 189 U.S., supra note 49, at 470.
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the brakes) so that the cars might be moved. When the cars were in
motion, then stopped suddenly, Behymer was thrown back on a
projecting nail from the running board, and injured himself when
he tried to recover his balance. It does seem clear that there is a risk
to stopping too suddenly; that the risk is enhanced by any icy
condition; and that the projecting nail could well have hurt or
distracted Behymer enough to prevent him from recovering his
balance. But there is no evidence in the case of any custom of the
trade that would justify the railroad’s behavior to move the cars given
these three factors. The case reads as one in which no custom was
involved at all or perhaps one in which a custom has been violated.
But there is no hint of any affirmative custom that would exonerate
the defendant from a charge of ordinary negligence. The decision
does not afford an instance of the industry lagging behind what is
required by due care.
4. T6e ImpracticaZ Precaution. The last of the cases cited by
Learned Hand, Sbandrew v. Chicago, St. Paul, M. &’ 0. RaiZway,63
arose when a railroad employee, riding atop a train, was thrown to
his death when the train suddenly and violently stopped. The
negligence alleged was the failure to inspect properly a brake hose
that burst while in use on the train. The plaintiff alleged that the
railroad was negligent in using a spliced hose to replace the original,
but the evidence suggested this was common custom and that these
spliced hoses were as safe as any other.64 The plaintiff further alleged
that the railroad omitted a proper inspection, which was said to
require a test of the hose “by giving it any more than the pressure
which is usually applied in the use of a hose.“65 In dealing with this
objection, the court noted first that the custom of the trade was
uniformly the other way and that the only inspection given before
use of a hose was a visual one. It then made the further argument
that the excessive pressure demanded of the plaintiff could well be
sufficient to burst a hose that would have been safe in its ordinary
use. There is no evidence in Shandrew that the purported additional
precaution was better than those which were already taken. Indeed
the proposed alternative was likely to have made matters worse. The
63 142 F. 320, supra note 49.
64 Id. at 325.
65 Id. at 326.
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right way to deal with untested customs was that adopted by the
court. There is surely a residual risk of accident, but none that a
generalized cost-benefit formula could override.
The great risk raised by the case lies in quite the opposite direction, and it is one that infects the entire area. The defendant was all
too eager to introduce evidence that indicated why its compliance
with custom was prudent under the circumstances. Its lawyer took
the commendable view that it was best to nail down the favorable
verdict with all evidence available. While that might speak of prudence for the attorney in the individual case, it presents a systematic
challenge that tends to undermine the effective operation of the
system. In other cases where it is harder to get at the costs and
benefits of the dominant rule, the failure to present cost-benefit evidence will be regarded as a gap in the case so long as this evidence is
admissible at all. Only the hard-edged rule that denies the introduction of cost-benefit information to bolster an established custom can
avoid the negative inferences otherwise drawn from silence. Yet to
adopt that rule is to rely exclusively on the institutional arguments
for custom to the exclusion of the particular case. In some sense the
success of some plaintiffs thus paves the way for a mixed system that
takes both custom and cost-benefit analyses into account. For surely,
if the defendant is entitled to introduce cost-benefit evidence to bolster custom, then the defendant can introduce cost-benefit evidence
to undercut it.
V. THE T.J. HOOPER
With this examination complete, I turn briefly to The TJ
Hooper itself As a matter of doctrine, it does seem clear that
Learned Hand did not take any position that was out of the ordinary. His concern to express the disjunction between custom and
reasonable care may have rested in part from his effort to distance
himself from two earlier Second Circuit decisions, Ketterer v. Armour &f Co.,& and one of his earlier admiralty cases, Spang Chalfant
& Co. Inc, , Dimon S.S. CorporatioQ7 which, on a complex question
of cargo stowage, took the position that courts “must depend upon
66 247 F. 921, 931 (2d Cir. 1917) (testing of pork for trichinae, a “general
custom” is said to offer the “most satisfactory evidence” of due care.)
67 57 F.2d. 965 (2d Cir. 1932).
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those whose greater experience gives their estimates, even if no
better than honest guesses, more weight than our speculations.“68
Hand’s short term motive was probably only to bring the Second
Circuit back in line with what he thought to be the general view of
the subject, notwithstanding language that could be read to the
contrary.
Nonetheless, the most critical point about the decision is Hand’s
apparent misreading of the record. There is little doubt that the
rhetorical force of his opinion rests upon his assertion that there was
no custom in the industry to carry these sets on board. The point of
his remarks, if true, is that it suggests the radical disjunction between
the requirements of the trade on the one hand and the dictates of
prudence on the other. It would make The T.J Hooper the perfect
case to show the wisdom of the standard common law approach.
Even the most casual form of armchair empiricism, whether of the
1920s or today, would lead anyone to conclude that radios are an
unmixed blessing for ocean transport. The perils of the seas are so
widely known and rehearsed that they hardly need to be repeated.
Even if the tug was not towing a barge laden with cargo, its captain
and crew should want to have a radio on board for their own protection and that of the tug. The addition of barge and cargo only
increases the gain from using radio without any offsetting increase
in its cost. If the world were as Hand described it-one in which no
custom had emerged on the use of radios-there is powerful, if not
conclusive, evidence of a gap between common practice and-due care
that it was imperative for the law to bridge.
The difficulty with Hand’s decision is the factual premise on
which it rests. The imperative need for radio communication was
apparent to outsiders to the business. Radio was the growth industry
of the 192os, and its rapid expansion was plain to all.69 The Navy
made extensive efforts to keep the spectrum-under its control because
68 Id at 967.
69 The cargo owner’s brief contains a telling passage from Frederick Lewis
Allen, Only Yesterday: An informal history of the nineteen-twenties (1931),
that recounts the commercial growth of the industry. Allen noted that by the
spring of 1922 radio had become a craze. Sales of radio equipment jumped from
$60 million to $842 million from 1922 to 1929. See Brief for New England Coal
and Coke Co., at 30, n.5, The TJ. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932)
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of its vast use as an aid to navigation? There were several high level
conferences in the 1920s to discuss the fate of the spectrum.71 These
were quickly followed by the Radio Act of 1927,72 which introduced
the current system of frequency allocation carried forward by the
Federal Communications Act of 1934.~3 In light of this history, the
district court found that “[rladio broadcasting was no new or untried
thing in March 1928. Everywhere, and in almost every field of
activity, it was being utilized as an aid to communication, and for
the dissemination of information.“74 That radio sets were in
widespread use on vessels of all kinds is clearly indicated by the
testimony in this case. “The coastwise towing experts who testified
in this case were unanimous in the opinion that an efficient radio
receiving set in March 1928 constituted a part of the necessary
equipment on every well-equipped tug, and that radio weatl ler reports in the coastwise towage service constituted important information in order to take proper precautions in navigation.“75
The testimony further indicated that at least 90 percent of the
tugs in the defendant’s company and others along the coast relied
upon the receiving sets.76 It is likely that the other IO percent followed as quickly as time and circumstance permitted. On the
strength of this’ record it is quite amazing that Learned Hand
treated this case as one in which there was no established custom.
The evidence is against his point, and, wholly apart from the merits
of the issue, he should have been bound by the determination of fact
below. Yet he wrote--it is impossible to say why-“[i]t is not fair to
say that there was a general custom among coastwise carriers so to
equip their tugs. One line alone did it; as for the rest, they relied on
their crews, so far as they can be said to have relied at all.“” This is a
misleading way to characterize both the evidence and the finding.
‘O For the early history, see Jonathan Emord, Freedom, Technology and
the First Amendment, ch. 11 (199l), and the earlier account in R.H. Coase,
The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. Law’ & Econ. 1 (1959).
‘l See Emord, supra note 70, at 146-53.
72 Id. at 171
73 Id
74 Sek Brief, supra note 69, at 35.
7s Id. at 29-30.
76 Id. at 35.
” 60 F. 2d, supra note 4, at 739.
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The most that can be said for Hand’s position is that the duty was
delegated by the tug owner to the crew, but, as with other forms of
delegation, the tug owner is responsible if the delegation misfires
and leaves the ship unseaworthy in consequence. Hand seems to
have altered the record in the case in order to make his legal point
that custom is not dispositive on the issue of due care and seems to
have done so in circumstances calculated to attract attention. In a
sense his treatment completes the cycle. There is a uniform line of
cases that stand for the proposition that custom is at most evidence
for due care in a negligence action. Yet there is not a single one of
these critical cases relied upon by Learned Hand where that proposition is true. In each and every one of them, the outcome is better
explained on narrower grounds, and while there is doubtless some
case in which the general proposition is true, that fact alone offers
no reason for deviating from the unbending rule that custom is
conclusive evidence of good care in negligence cases arising out of
consensual arrangements.
VI. CLOSING REMARKS
The T.J Hooper, then, does not derive its influence from its
doctrinal originality. It followed a line of cases that held much the
same thing. Earlier cases established the relationship between custom and due care and treated it as an arid proposition that concerned
the internal operation of the negligence law. Clarence Morris
thought that the critical distinction was between two senses of reasonable or average care: the statistical sense and the value-laden
sense. In his view, custom was thought to establish the former,
while the ultimate issue was the latter? There is an important internal difficulty with Morris’s formulation, for it is doubtful that any
negligence rule should ever hold that one-half of any calling-that
below the median-is negligence, and this difficulty is obviated with
custom as a standard, for everyone can comply with the customary
standard. But these conceptual fine points are about law and for
lawyers. What Learned Hand was able to do was to project the same
point in a different light. He was able to make the gap between
custom and negligence seem less like a fine point in the law of torts
‘* Morris, supra note 10, at 1155.

40

WORKING PAPER IN

LAW BC

ECONOMICS

and more like an attack on industry, one that gained credibility because it was authored by a great judge whose own conservative credentials could scarcely be called into doubt. In effect, The T.J
Hooper erected a populist manifesto for the tort law.
Within the law of admiralty and the law of automobile accidents, there is little perhaps that this change in orientation can
achieve. But the remarks were carried over into the expanding areas
of medical malpractice and product liability, where they served to
direct social criticism toward physicians and other health care
providers on the one hand and product manufacturers on the other.
In the former context, The TJ Hooper did not fall on fertile ground.
The famous passage from this case (along with Bebymer) was set out
in HeZZing v. Carey,79 where it has received a chilly reception and has
not worked its way into the dominant fabric of the law.*O Even
Clarence Morris criticized the effort to oust the standard of customary care in negligence cases on the ground that custom was
probably the only “workable test available.“*1
That skepticism has not, however, carried over to product liability law. That branch was the litigation backwater it deserved to be
when the concept of defect was defined so that one could only
challenge one discrete unit on the grounds that it deviated from the
standards set by the firm for the product. But it became big business
once custom was no longer the standard by which the safety or defectiveness of products was judged. It became possible to challenge
an entire industry whose custom “lagged” behind what reasonable
prudence dictated, as the famous quotation from The T.J Hooper is
trotted out at critical junctures to justify the movement away from
any market-based standard of liability. Assumption of risk is no
longer an absolute defense against charges of liability unless it is unreasonable, and it thus becomes a species of contributory negligence. 82 Liability is not restricted to latent defects, where there is a
colorable claim that the condition of the product was misrepresented
79 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974).
*O Helling was overruled by Wash. Rev. Code 54.24.290. It has been disavowed elsewhere. See, for example, Barton v. Owen, 71 Cal. App. 3d 484,
139 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1977).
*l
Morris,supra note10, at 1164.
82 See, Restatement, supra note 14, at §402A, comment tt.
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by the manufacturer to the consumer. Common practice is never an
absolute defense but is admissible as evidence on the state of the
art.83
The overall pattern is clear. The successive layers of protection
against government intervention are thus pierced one at a time, so
that in the end it is possible to attach liability to known defects
sanctioned both by common practice and individualized assumption
of the risk. With all the limitations on liability put to one side, there
was but one technique by which such a development could take
place: the cost-benefit calculus of the Hand formula in Carroll
Towing, championed by both Landes and Posner and by Shavell
ironically becomes the “risk/utility” test of Wade that has received
such prominence in the decided cases.84 The rhetoric of Learned
Hand has fit in perfectly with the antimarket rationales that dominate this area of thought, so that The T.J Hooper has its greatest influence and vitality in an area that lies far removed from the admiralty controversy that gave it birth.
The effectiveness of Hand’s condemnatory rhetoric has not diminished with time. It is always open season on an established practice, as the cost-benefit approach can be used, without rudder or
compass, to override the established custom. “[A] whole calling may
83 Perhaps the leading discussion is in Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey
et al., 609 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980), which reaffirmed the admissibility of
custom on the state-of-the-art question, where it is not decisive. A plaintiff
may show that a design alternative that has not been put into use is- nonetheless feasible, a determination that requires courts and juries to make trade-offs
between quality, safety, and price that are better done by markets. A minority
of courts hold that a strict liability standard of tort liability does not even
permit a defendant to raise a state-of-the-art defense. See, for example, Johnson
v. Hannibal Mower Corp., 679 S.W.2d 884 (MO. Ct. App. 1984) (evidence of
conformity with industry standards inadmissible, as is evidence that manufacturer’s design was the safest available with existing technology).
84 Wade, supra note 47. It would be nice to report that Wade cited Learned
Hand, but he did not. The influence of his dictum in The TJ. Hooper is picked
up in Marshall S. Shapo, 1 The Law of Products Liability, ch. 10-6 (1989),
which is immediately followed by a long discussion of state-of-the-art and costbenefit tests. Shapo’s next chapter is then devoted to finding the rules which
allow for the public determination of reasonable design standards; it begins
with a repetition of Hand’s point. Id. at ch. 11-2 to 11-3.
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have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices.“85
There are many competitors for this questionable honor, but Hand’s
famous statement is perhaps the most influential, and mischievous,
sentence in the history of the law of torts.

85 60 F.2d, supra note 4, at 740.
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